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Business Associations
by Paul A. Quir6s*
Lynn S. Scott"
and William S. Smoak Jr.***
INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys noteworthy cases in the areas of corporate,
limited liability company, partnership, agency, and joint venture law
decided between June 1, 2008 and May 31, 2009 by the Georgia Supreme
Court, the Georgia Court of Appeals, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, and the United States district courts located in
Georgia.' In addition, this Article provides an overview of important
enactments during the 2009 Session of the Georgia General Assembly to
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) with respect to
banking, finance, commerce, corporation, partnership, and business
associations statutes.

* Partner in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Furman University
(B.A., cum laude, 1979); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 1982).
Member, Mercer Law Review (1980-1982); Lead Articles II Editor (1981-1982). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of ing & Spalding LLP, Redwood Shores, California.
University of Georgia (B.S., 1971); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law
(J.D., magna cum laude, 1988). Member, Mercer Law Review (1986-1988); Research Editor
(1987-1988). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina. Davidson
College (BA, magna cun laude, 2002); Duke University School of Law (J.D., magna cum
laude, 2006). Member, Journal of Law & Contemporary Problems (2004-2006); Staff Editor
(2004-2005); Articles Editor (2005-2006). Member, State Bars of Georgia and North
Carolina.
1. For analysis of Georgia business associations law during the prior survey period, see
Paul A. Quir6s et al., BusinessAssociations, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L.
REV. 35 (2008).
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ISSUES OF FIRST IMPRESSION

A. Court of Appeals Deems ESOP Participants"Beneficial Owners"
for Purposes of Exercising ShareholderRights
In Kelley Manufacturing Co. v. Martin,2 the Georgia Court of Appeals
examined an issue of first impression in Georgia-whether employee
stock ownership plan (ESOP) participants should be considered
"beneficial owners" of shares of stock of a Georgia corporation and should
be entitled to exercise common law and statutory rights conferred by
virtue of that status.3 Kelley Manufacturing Company (KMC), a
Georgia corporation, established an ESOP in 1990. KMC made annual
cash contributions to the ESOP on behalf of KMC employees. In turn,
the ESOP invested the cash contributions in KMC stock. Based on these
investments, the ESOP was KMC's sole shareholder of record.4
Lanier Carson, the long-standing chief executive at KMC and trustee
of the ESOP, retired in October 2006. James Martin succeeded Carson
and assumed the roles of chairman of the board, chief executive officer,
and co-trustee of the ESOP. Also following Carson's retirement, Timothy
Maxwell was named president of KMC and co-trustee of the ESOP along
with Martin.5
The tenures of the new executives were short-lived. In March 2007
KMC terminated Maxwell and Martin based on Carson's vote of 135
employees' proxies and powers of attorney, all of which purportedly
authorized Carson to fire Maxwell and Martin and remove them from
their co-trustee positions with the ESOP.
Under the purported
instructions of those same documents, Carson was voted sole trustee of
the ESOP and chairman of the KMC board of directors.6
Following termination, Martin and Maxwell retained their outstanding
ownership interests in the ESOP. In May 2007 Martin and Maxwell
sent a letter to KMC requesting inspection of various corporate records,
including copies of the proxies and powers of attorney substantiating
their firings and a list of KMC shareholders at that time. Although
KMC provided some of the documents requested, it refused to allow
7
access to the shareholder list, the proxies, and the powers of attorney.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

296 Ga. App. 236, 674 S.E.2d 92 (2009).
Id. at 239, 674 S.E.2d at 95.
Id. at 237, 674 S.E.2d at 94.
Id.
Id. at 237-38, 674 S.E.2d at 94.
Id. at 238, 674 S.E.2d at 94.
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A lawsuit followed wherein Martin and Maxwell petitioned under
O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-1602 to -16048 for inspection of corporate records. 9
KMC moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Maxwell and
Martin did not have standing to pursue inspection of KMC's documents
because under the Georgia Business Corporations Code (the GBCC) 10
they were not "shareholders."" In denying KMC's motion, the trial
court determined that the ESOP participants were beneficial owners of
KMC's stock
and, thus, were entitled to exercise shareholder inspection
2
rights.'
In affirming the trial court's decision, the court of appeals first noted
that the GBCC defines a "shareholder" as either a record owner or a
beneficial owner of shares of stock. 3 Further, the court of appeals4
observed that the Georgia books and records inspection statute
provides that, for purposes of inspection, a "shareholder" includes any
"'beneficial owner whose shares are held [either] in a voting trust or by
a nominee on his behalf.'"'15
Acknowledging that the ESOP was the record owner of the shares and
that no nominee or voting trust was on file with KMC regarding those
shares, the court of appeals rested its decision on case law from several
other jurisdictions. 6 In those cases, the courts held that, "although the
ESOP participants did not meet the technical definitions of shareholders
in the relevant statutes, they were 'equitable owners' entitled to pursue
their claims." 7 Concluding that those cases were well-reasoned, the
court of appeals held that Maxwell and Martin had standing to pursue
relief under O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-1602 to -1604.'1

8. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-1602 to -1604 (2003 & Supp. 2009).
9. Kelley Mfg. Co., 296 Ga. App. at 238, 674 S.E.2d at 94.
10. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-101 to -1703 (2003 & Supp. 2009).
11. Kelley Mfg. Co., 296 Ga. App. at 238-39, 674 S.E.2d at 95.
12. Id. at 239, 674 S.E.2d at 95.
13. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-140(27) (Supp. 2009)).
14. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602 (2003 & Supp. 2009).
15. Kelley Mfg. Co., 296 Ga. App. at 239, 674 S.E.2d at 95 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-21602(g)).
16. Id.

17. Id. (citing Housman v. Albright, 857 N.E.2d 724, 729-30 (Ml1.
App. Ct. 2006); Elish
v. Wilson, 434 S.E.2d 411, 418 (W. Va. 1993)).

18. Id. KMC also argued that Maxwell and Martin were not entitled to the books and
records they sought because their request was not for a "proper purpose." Id. at 240, 674
S.E.2d at 96. The court of appeals quickly disposed of this argument, noting that Maxwell
and Martin had satisfied their burden of showing a proper purpose because the documents
at issue were relevant to monitoring proper corporate governance, determining if
mismanagement or breaches of fiduciary duty were occurring, and protecting their

substantial economic investment in KMC (as well as the investment of the other
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The decision in Kelley Manufacturing has implications beyond the
specific setting of the lawsuit. Although the books and records
provisions of the GBCC were at issue in this case, the broad language
used by the court of appeals in referring to the status and rights of
ESOP participants as beneficial owners (for example, that ESOP
participants are "entitled to exercise shareholders' rights, including
inspection of ... records" 9 ) indicates that Georgia courts may be
willing to consider ESOP participants as shareholders for other
purposes, such as derivative lawsuits. Indeed, the Illinois and West
Virginia decisions cited by the court of appeals both involved shareholder
derivative actions.2'
Practitioners should be aware of the Kelley
Manufacturingdecision going forward because its reasoning expands the
class of persons traditionally thought to enjoy shareholder rights under
Georgia corporate law.
B. Court of Appeals Opines on the Scope of FiduciaryDuties
Applicable to Georgia Limited Liability Companies
In ULQ, LLC v. Meder,2" the Georgia Court of Appeals commented
on several salient topics concerning fiduciary duties in the context of a
Georgia limited liability company (LLC).22 In Meder four individuals
formed ULQ, a Georgia LLC, to operate a debt collection agency.
Terrance Meder and two others each contributed $75,000 to ULQ. In
return, each received ten percent of ULQ's ownership interests. The
fourth investor (the managing member) contributed $350,000 to ULQ's
capital in exchange for the remaining seventy percent ownership
interests.2 3
In connection with ULQ's formation, the members executed an
operating agreement providing that the managing member would act as
the sole member of ULQ's board of managers, a body which exercised all
managerial power over the entity's business and affairs.24 Additionally,
the agreement expressly provided the board with authority to terminate
ULQ officers, stating:
Any officer may be removed as such, either with or without cause, by
the Board of Managers whenever in [its] judgment the best interests
of [ULQI will be served thereby; provided, however, that such removal

shareholders). Id. at 241, 674 S.E.2d at 96.
19. Id. at 239, 674 S.E.2d at 95.
20. See id. (citing Housman, 857 N.E.2d at 726; Elish, 434 S.E.2d at 413).
21. 293 Ga. App. 176, 666 S.E.2d 713 (2008).

22. See id. at 180, 666 S.E.2d at 718.
23. Id. at 176-77, 666 S.E.2d at 715.
24. Id.
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shall be without prejudice to the contract rights, if any, of the Officer
so removed."
In the event that ULQ terminated a member's employment, the
agreement provided for call rights whereby ULQ could purchase the
terminated member's interest at a specified price. During 2003 26that
price was equivalent to the value of the member's capital account.
In November 2003 the managing member terminated Meder as an
officer and employee for alleged abuse of ULQ employees. Thereafter,
ULQ exercised its right to purchase Meder's interests. The call price
was zero dollars, as ULQ's prior operating losses had exhausted the
entire value of Meder's capital account.
Meder then filed suit, alleging that ULQ's actions breached the
agreement and breached fiduciary duties owed by ULQ to him as a
member. ULQ counterclaimed for, among other things, Meder's breach
of fiduciary duty on the ground that he contacted clients during the
period between his termination and the purchase of his membership
interests and instructed them to withhold business from ULQ.' The
trial court denied ULQ's motion for summary judgment, holding that the
agreement contained an implied duty of good faith and that a factual
determination was necessary as to whether the managing member
properly discharged that duty in terminating Meder. Additionally, the
trial court granted Meder's motion for summary judgment, citing a lack
of competent evidence that Meder had made any inappropriate
comments to ULQ clients.29
The court of appeals first considered whether the managing member
was constrained by an implied duty of good faith when the managing
member determined that Meder's dismissal was in the best interests of
ULQ.3 ° The court noted that well-settled Georgia law requires a
discretionary decision pursuant to a contract to be made in good faith

25. Id. at 177, 666 S.E.2d at 715.
26. Id., 666 S.E.2d at 716.
27. Id.
28. Id. ULQ also counterclaimed against Meder for breach of contract on the basis that
the agreement required a member owning an economic interest in ULQ not to "interfere
with the business relationship of [ULQ] and any of its existing or prospective customers,
or attempt to induce, or encourage, any existing customer to terminate its relationship with
[ULQ]." Id. at 182, 666 S.E.2d at 719 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because ULQ's
evidence showed that Meder misinformed one prospective customer that "ULQ was
experiencing extreme financial difficulties that had resulted in Meder's termination," the
court of appeals reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment against ULQ on its
breach of contract claim. Id. at 183, 666 S.E.2d at 720.
29. Id. at 177-78, 666 S.E.2d at 716.
30. Id. at 178, 666 S.E.2d at 716.
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unless the express terms of such contract grant the party "absolute or
uncontrolled discretion in making [such] a decision."3 1 Because no
language in the agreement designated the managing member's discretion
as absolute or uncontrolled and because Meder offered evidence that he
was not abusive to ULQ employees, the court of appeals upheld the trial
court's denial of ULQ's motion for summary judgment on this issue. 2
Both circumstantial and direct evidence suggested that the managing
member's true motive for the termination was to purchase Meder's
interest for nothing at a time when the company was poised for financial
growth.33 Thus, a jury would have a factual basis to find that the
of good faith by terminating Meder
managing member breached its duty
34
for the purpose of pecuniary gain.
Second, the court of appeals evaluated whether ULQ as an entity owed
a fiduciary duty to Meder as a member.3" Noting a managing member
controls an LLC-rather than vice versa-the court of appeals observed
that to hold an LLC responsible for the breach of a managing member's
duties would make little analytical sense.36 Moreover, finding such
liability "would shift the cost of that breach to the [LLC] (and indirectly
to its members), thereby shifting the cost to the very parties harmed by
the breach."" Based on this rationale, as well as decisions in other
jurisdictions applying the same analytical construct to fiduciary duty
lawsuits against corporations when the underlying wrongdoing was
perpetrated by a corporate officer or director, the court of appeals held
that a Georgia LLC "owes no fiduciary duty to its members, either
directly or vicariously, for actions taken by its manager."3 8 As such,
the trial court should have granted ULQ's motion for summary judgment
on Meder's3 9claim, and the court of appeals reversed that decision
accordingly.
Finally, the court of appeals examined ULQ's assertion that as a
member of ULQ, Meder owed it a fiduciary duty of loyalty and his

31. Id. at 179,666 S.E.2d at 717 (citing Hunting Aircraft, Inc. v. Peachtree City Airport
Auth., 281 Ga. App. 450, 453, 636 S.E.2d 139, 141-42 (2006)).
32. Id. at 179-80, 666 S.E.2d at 717-18.
33. Id., 666 S.E.2d at 717.
34. Id. at 180, 666 S.E.2d at 717-18.
35. Id., 666 S.E.2d at 718.
36. Id. (citing Arnold v. Soc'y for Say. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 540 (Del. 1996)).
37. Id. at 181, 666 S.E.2d at 718.
38. Id. (citing Onex Food Servs. v. Greiser, Nos. 93 Civ. 0278 (DC), 94 Civ. 3063 (DC),
1996 WL 103975, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1996); Johnston v. Wilbourn, 760 F. Supp. 578,
590 (S.D. Miss. 1991); Burcham v. Unison Bancorp, Inc., 77 P.3d 130, 147 (Kan. 2003)).
39. Id., 666 S.E.2d at 719.
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40
alleged interference in customer relationships breached that duty.
Referencing O.C.G.A. § 14-11-305, 4 the court of appeals noted that
unless provided for in an LLC's operating agreement or its articles of
organization,

a person who is a member of a limited liability company in which
management is vested in one or more managers, and who is not a
manager, shall have no duties to the limited liability company or to the
other members solely by reason of acting in his or her capacity as a
member.'2
Although Meder was a member of ULQ, the agreement vested
complete management authority in the managing member.43 Because
Meder had no authority to manage the affairs of ULQ, O.C.G.A. § 14-11305 insulated Meder from any liability premised on a breach of fiduciary
duty theory.4" In holding that non-managing members owe no fiduciary
duties to an LLC or its members, the court of appeals emphasized that
parties are free to impose such duties in an operating agreement or
articles of organization. 5 Pursuant to this reasoning, the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment against
ULQ on its breach of fiduciary duty claim against Meder.4
The decision in Meder is significant for a number of reasons. First, it
clarifies that a member of a manager-managed Georgia LLC cannot be
held liable on a fiduciary duty theory unless such member is exercising
managerial authority or the LLC's governing documents provide that
such liability may attach. 47 While this issue holds less significance for
a "default" LLC under Georgia law (that is, when all members of the
LLC have managerial authority over the entity), practitioners certainly
should consider the import of the court's decision in Meder when drafting
an operating agreement for a manager-managed LLC, especially one
whose members are to be involved intimately in the LLC's day-to-day
operations. Second, practitioners should bear in mind that if the implied
duty of good faith is to be read into discretionary decisions made under
an operating agreement, careful drafting is necessary to ensure that the

40. Id. at 184, 666 S.E.2d at 720.
41.

O.C.G.A. § 14-11-305 (2003).

42. ULQ, 293 Ga. App. at 184, 666 S.E.2d at 720 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-11-305).
43. Id. at 176, 666 S.E.2d at 715.
44. Id. at 185, 666 S.E.2d at 721.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 184-85, 666 S.E.2d at 720-21.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

authority granted to the deciding party is "absolute or uncontrolled."' 8
Finally, when considering the initiation of a lawsuit for breach of
fiduciary duty in the LLC context, a practitioner should remember to sue
the party who perpetrated the breach, rather than the LLC alone.
Indeed, had Meder alleged a breach of fiduciary duty against the
managing member rather than ULQ, the outcome on that portion of
Meder's case may have been decidedly different.49
II.

CORPORATE SEPARATENESS

A. Assignee of Asset PurchaseAgreement Prohibitedfrom Enforcing
Restrictive Covenants
In Accurate Printers, Inc. v. Stark,5" the Georgia Court of Appeals
considered whether a non-party to a corporate asset purchase agreement
(APA) was entitled by virtue of its status as assignee to enforce certain
restrictive covenants contained therein.5 1 The case involved Accurate
Printers, Inc. (API), a Georgia corporation wholly owned by Steve Young
and involved in the printing business, and Oxford Printing, Inc., a
corporation wholly owned by Kenneth Stark. To expand his printing
operations, Young acquired ownership of Oxford's assets and equipment
by virtue of an asset purchase agreement between Oxford, Stark, and
52
himself.
The APA contained certain restrictive covenants whereby Oxford and
Stark agreed (1) not to compete with Young within a 125-mile radius of
Young's current place of business for a five-year period and (2) not to
solicit any of Young's customers within a 125-mile radius of Young's
current place of business for a five-year period. Following the transaction, Stark came to work for Young and API to assist with business
integration.
However, that employment relationship deteriorated
Stark
rapidly, and API soon terminated Stark's employment.5 3
thereafter joined Baxter Printing Co. and "[competed] with API, solicited
API's customers, [and] disclosed API's proprietary information. "54
API then filed suit against Stark, alleging, among other things, that
Stark had breached the restrictive covenants. During trial the court
granted Stark's motion for a directed verdict on API's claim based on

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See id. at 179, 666 S.E.2d at 717.
See id. at 181, 666 S.E.2d at 718-19.
295 Ga. App. 172, 671 S.E.2d 228 (2008).
Id. at 175, 671 S.E.2d at 231.
Id. at 173, 671 S.E.2d at 230.
Id. at 173-74, 671 S.E.2d at 230.
Id. at 174, 671 S.E.2d at 230.
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breach of the restrictive covenants because API was not a party to the
APA, and Young's subsequent assignment of the restrictive covenants to
API was invalid. Thereafter, API appealed the trial court's decision.55
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's directed verdict.56
Although Young was the owner of API, he chose to enter into the APA
in his individual capacity.57 Relying on the separateness doctrine,
which states that "'each corporation is a separate entity, distinct and
apart from its stockholders,' 5 8 the court of appeals held that "API was
not a party to the [riestrictive [clovenant, and thus, it was not entitled
to pursue a claim for its breach." 9 Moreover, Young's purported
assignment of the restrictive covenants to API was invalid as to Oxford
and Stark because the terms of the APA prohibited assignment of those
rights unless Oxford and Stark provided their prior written consent.60
As API failed to proffer any evidence of such written consent, API lacked
an essential element of its claim for breach-privity of contract.6 '
While the decision in Accurate Printersdoes not inject any revolutionary concepts into the doctrine of corporate separateness under Georgia
law, it does offer important guidance to practitioners when advising
corporate clients and shareholders in the acquisition context. Practitioners should carefully structure an acquisition agreement to provide for
signatory provisions and assignment provisions that comport with the
parties' understanding of exactly who is intended to benefit from the
particular rights and remedies included in such agreement. Failure to
draft an acquisition agreement in a manner that comports with such
understanding leaves open the possibility that one of the parties may be
deprived of the benefit of its bargain under certain future circumstances.
B. Court of Appeals Disapprovesof Corporation'sAttempt to Pierce
Its Own Corporate Veil to Advance Claims of Tortious Interference
In All Star, Inc. v. Fellows,62 a Georgia corporation, All Star, Inc.,
placed amusement game machines in various Georgia retail locations.
Because All Star's sole owner, Larry Simmons, anticipated that state
legislation would soon prohibit All Star's business, Simmons sought to
expand that business into neighboring states. To accomplish this task,

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 174-75, 671 S.E.2d at 231.
Id. at 175, 671 S.E.2d at 231.
Id.
Id. (quoting Levy v. Reiner, 290 Ga. App. 471, 473, 659 S.E.2d 848, 851 (2008)).
Id.
Id. at 175-76, 671 S.E.2d at 231-33.
Id. at 175-77, 671 S.E.2d at 231-33.
297 Ga. App. 142, 676 S.E.2d 808 (2009).
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Simmons financed the start-up of an Alabama corporation, D.R. Awtrey
& Associates, Inc., doing business as Alabama Amusements (Amusements). One of Simmons's former business associates, David Awtrey,
was the sole owner of Amusements and served as its president. Awtrey
ran Amusements' day-to-day operations, soliciting businesses for the
placement of games, placing the gaming equipment, and collecting
money generated thereby. Another colleague, Shawn Fellows, handled
various business matters for Amusements. Notably, All Star's revenue
was commingled with that of Amusements; expenses incurred by
Amusements were paid with All Star's funds, and All Star included
Awtrey on its list of covered individuals in its health insurance plan.'
Within a year, Awtrey was no longer Amusements' president, and
Simmons owned one hundred percent of the corporation. Dissatisfied
that Amusements was not paying them appropriate commissions, Awtrey
and Fellows established a separate company to engage in a similar
business. In the process, the duo secured the business of three clients
64
with whom Awtrey had placed games while working for Amusements.
Upon learning of the establishment of the competing business, All Star
initiated suit, alleging that Fellows and Awtrey had committed tortious
interference with All Star's business relationships.6 5
At trial, the defense argued that an essential element of All Star's
claim, the existence of a business relationship between All Star and the
three allegedly stolen customers in Alabama, was lacking. According to
the defense, the undisputed evidence showed that All Star and
Amusements were separate corporations and that the three customers
in question were former customers of Amusements only."6 The defense
maintained that All Star was "attempting to pierce its own corporate veil
to claim another corporation's customers and thus make out its
claim."67 The trial court agreed with this assessment of the merits and
entered directed verdicts in favor of the defendants on the tortious
interference claim.6
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court, noting that "'[gireat
caution should be exercised ... in disregarding the [separate existence
of a] corporate entity'"69 and that "'the mere existence of some

63. Id. at 144-45, 676 S.E.2d at 811-12.
64. Id. at 145-46, 676 S.E.2d at 812.
65. Id. at 142, 676 S.E.2d at 809.
66. Id. at 146, 676 S.E.2d at 812.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 147, 676 S.E.2d at 812-13.
69. Id. at 148,676 S.E.2d at 813 (quoting Hickman v. Hyzer, 261 Ga. 38,39,401 S.E.2d
738, 739 (1991)).
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unspecified "affiliation" is not sufficient to pierce the corporate veil.'"7 °
In holding for the defendants, the court of appeals noted that "[alithough
All Star showed instances in which it disregarded its corporate
separateness from ... Amusements, such acts can serve as no justification for the court also to disregard it for All Star's benefit."71 Essentially, the court of appeals followed the well-established precept that veil
piercing is to be used by third parties to prevent instances of injustice
and inequity, not as a tool to reward a corporation for its own failure to
adhere to corporate formalities.72
As the All Star case illustrates, practitioners always should bear in
mind the equitable underpinnings of the veil-piercing doctrine when
seeking to invoke it for a client's benefit. Because of those equitable
considerations, any attempt on behalf of a corporate or individual
shareholder to erase the common law distinction between the shareholder and the legal entity it has created will be viewed suspiciously by a
Georgia court.
C. Failureto Adhere to CorporateFormalitiesYields Potential
PersonalLiability for Shareholder
At issue in Walker v. ACE Auto Sales & Leasing, Inc. 73 were certain
loans provided by the plaintiffs, Raymond Walker and Jack Boatright,
to ACE Auto Sales & Leasing, Inc., a Georgia corporation. This
arrangement involved unwritten agreements between the plaintiffs and
Leonard Mason, who acted as a purported agent or employee of ACE.
From time to time, the plaintiffs would loan Leonard Mason funds for
the purchase of automobiles from wholesale used car auctions. Although
the parties did not agree when the loans would be due, they acknowledged that repayment would include both principal and ten percent
interest. The plaintiffs retained physical possession of the certificates
of title for the vehicles as security for the loans.74
Following an alleged default by ACE on loans then outstanding, the
plaintiffs brought suit against ACE, Leonard Mason, and Deborah
Mason.75 The evidence submitted showed that Deborah Mason was the
sole shareholder, officer, and director of ACE. Despite the fact that she
was the only person with actual or apparent authority to bind the

70. Id. (quoting Yukon Partners v. Lodge Keeper Group, 258 Ga. App. 1, 6, 572 S.E.2d
647, 651 (2002)).
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. 294 Ga. App. 267, 668 S.E.2d 877 (2008).
74. Id. at 267, 668 S.E.2d at 878.
75. Id.
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company, Deborah Mason never worked in the business. Her role was
limited to signing tax returns and maintaining licenses, bonding, and
insurance. Although Leonard Mason was not an employee of ACE and
had no official connection to ACE, he was in charge of its day-to-day
business operations. In addition, while Leonard Mason was aware that
the plaintiffs kept the certificates of title as security for the loans ACE
used to purchase those vehicles, he stated that he would frequently sell
the cars without repaying the plaintiffs from the proceeds or even
notifying them of the sales. When this occurred, Leonard Mason
admitted that he knew purchasers of those cars often attempted to
procure replacement
titles in an effort to circumvent the plaintiffs'
76
security interest.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the Masons on the
ground that the plaintiffs were unable to provide sufficient evidence to
pierce ACE's corporate veil.77 The court of appeals disagreed and
reversed. 7' Noting that the issue of piercing the corporate veil is
typically a jury question, "especially where there is evidence that 'the
corporate arrangement was a sham, used to defeat justice'" or evade
contractual responsibility, the court of appeals held that, based on the
plaintiffs' evidence, a reasonable juror could have concluded that ACE
was a mere instrumentality of the Masons used to perpetrate fraud upon
the plaintiffs.79
Given the plaintiffs' evidence in Walker, it appears quite probable that
the Masons will be held personally liable for the debts of ACE. When
advising clients on the formation of a corporation and the structure of its
operations, practitioners should carefully explain that the corporate form
will not necessarily shield the individual owners from liability in all
instances, especially when the owners have caused the entity to engage
in objectively suspect behavior.
III.

FIDUCIARY DUTIES

In Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. of Atlanta v. Holley,' a Georgia
corporation, Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Company of Atlanta, Inc. (HRH),
brought (among other claims) a breach of fiduciary duty action against
Hugh Holley, one of HRH's former officers. A large insurance brokerage,
HRH purchased Holley's independent insurance brokerage in August

76. Id. at 269-70, 668 S.E.2d at 879.
77. Id. at 269, 668 S.E.2d at 879.
78. Id. at 270, 668 S.E.2d at 879.
79. Id. at 269-70, 668 S.E.2d at 879 (quoting Derbyshire v. United Builders Supplies,
Inc., 194 Ga. App. 840, 844, 392 S.E.2d 37, 40 (1990)).
80. 295 Ga. App. 54, 670 S.E.2d 874 (2008).

2009]

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

1997. Holley thereafter assumed employment with HRH as a vice
president. This relationship continued until February 2003 when Holley
abruptly resigned from HRH and started working for another insurance
brokerage the next business day.8 ' The trial evidence showed that
during the two months before his resignation, Holley (1) "sought and
obtained approval from an existing or potential [HRH] client to appoint
him as the client's contact at the competitor's brokerage," (2) provided
insurance policy pricing and other HRH proprietary information to the
competitor, and (3) alerted the competitor to a potential broker
acquisition prospect.82 The jury returned a verdict against Holley on
the breach of fiduciary duty claim and awarded money damages in an
amount equivalent to the last two months of Holley's salary at HRH.'
Holley then appealed.'
Following established principles of Georgia common law, the Georgia
Court of Appeals upheld the jury's verdict.'
Because Holley had
discretionary authority to solicit business on behalf of HRH and to bind
HRH to contractual obligations, Holley in fact owed a fiduciary duty of
loyalty to HRH as an officer and was not exempt from such duty as a
mere employee.' The court of appeals then described the timing flaw
that befell Holley during his attempt to transition to a competitor:
[A] corporate officer does not breach fiduciary duties owed to the
corporation simply by making plans to start a competing company
while still employed by the corporation. Even before termination of
employment, an officer is entitled to make arrangements to compete.... But during the term of employment with the corporation,the
officer may not solicit customers for a competing company or otherwise
engage in direct competition with the corporation'sbusiness. 7

Because the actions Holley took during the two months prior to his
departure constituted customer solicitation and direct competition with
HRH's business, Holley breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty.88
Holley reaffirms a principle of Georgia law embodied in a number of
previous cases that officers and directors owe identical fiduciary duties

81. Id. at 55, 670 S.E.2d at 875.
82. Id. at 59, 670 S.E.2d at 878.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 54, 670 S.E.2d at 875.
85. Id. at 58-59, 670 S.E.2d at 877-78.
86. Id. at 58, 670 S.E.2d at 877.
87. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gresham
& Assocs., Inc. v. Strianese, 265 Ga. App. 559, 560-61, 595 S.E.2d 82, 84-85 (2004)).
88. Id. at 58-59, 670 S.E.2d at 877-78.
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to the corporations they serve.8 9 Interestingly, it was only earlier this
year that a state court in Delaware-often considered the epicenter of
corporate law jurisprudence in the United States--explicitly held this
same principle to be applicable in the context of a Delaware corporation.'
Practitioners may find the decision in Holley helpful in several
respects. First, the case provides insight for a practitioner's counseling
of a client who serves as an officer of a Georgia corporation as to the
scope of actions that the client may or may not take prior to leaving a
current employer. In this setting, of course, practitioners should also
request from the client any employment agreements or noncompetition
agreements that are in effect between the client and the corporation
because such agreements may contain provisions that materially restrict
the client's proposed course of action. Second, a practitioner who is
considering disassociation from membership or partnership at a law firm
should bear in mind that the holding in Holley is not limited solely to
the corporate context.
IV.

AN UPDATE ON THE FULTON COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT'S
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION91

Consistent with past iterations of this Article, the Authors wish to
provide a brief discussion on the Fulton County Superior Court's
Business Case Division (Business Court). As litigants and practitioners
have become more aware of the Business Court's ability to resolve
litigation with accuracy and efficiency, the Business Court has experienced increased activity on its docket. For example, in May 2007, prior
to an amendment to Fulton County Superior Court Rule 1004,92 which
expanded the Business Court's jurisdiction, eighteen cases sat on its
docket.9 3 That number has steadily increased over the past two years,

89. See, e.g., Am. Bldgs. Co. v. Pascoe Bldg. Sys., Inc., 260 Ga. 346,349, 392 S.E.2d 860,
864 (1990) (applying the fiduciary duty of loyalty to corporate officers); Gresham, 265 Ga.
App. at 560, 595 S.E.2d at 84 (same); E.D. Lacey Mills, Inc. v. Keith, 183 Ga. App. 357,
362-63, 359 S.E.2d 148, 155 (1987) (same).
90. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 (Del. 2009).
91. While the Authors acknowledge that certain statistics in Part IV pertain to periods
of time outside of the June 1, 2008 to May 31, 2009 scope of this Article, they believe the
inclusion of such information is essential to provide a more complete picture of the
Business Court's recent activities.
92. FULTON COUNTY SUPER. CT. R. 1004, available at http:J/www.fultoncourt.org/sca

200807/documents-and-forms/docdownload/6-business-court-rules.html.
93. See Paul A. Quir6s et al., Business Associations,Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 59

MERCER L. REV. 35, 51 (2007).
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and at the end of July 2009, there were forty pending cases. 4 Consistent with the increase in the number of its pending cases, the Business
Court has experienced growth in the number of cases it resolves. During
the eighteen-month period from January 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007, the
Business Court resolved just nine cases.95 From June 1, 2007 to May
31, 2008, this number grew to fourteen cases;9" during the June 1, 2008
to May 31, 2009 period, the Business Court disposed of twenty cases,
including two that involved trials. 97 All told, since its inception in
October 2005, the Business Court has served over 225 business
litigants.9"
In light of this expansion in workload, the Georgia Supreme Court
approved an amendment to Rule 1004 on May 6, 2009. 99 Pursuant to
this amendment, an active Fulton County Superior Court judge, the
Honorable Melvin K Westmoreland, now serves on the Business Court
and devotes a substantial portion of his docket to Business Court
disputes.1" Judge Westmoreland was appointed on July 1, 2009, and
sits alongside the Business Court's senior members, Senior Judge
Elizabeth E. Long and Senior Judge Alice D. Bonner.1" 1 The addition
of Judge Westmoreland will allow the Business Court to expand and
increase its operating efficiency without a commensurate increase in
operating costs."°2 Furthermore, this appointment responds to concerns that only unelected, senior judges were hearing Business Court

cases. 103
Perhaps the Business Court's most striking asset is its policy of
promptly issuing written orders on litigants' motions. The Business
Court typically provides a written order within thirty days of a motion
hearing or the completion of the record on a motion, whichever occurs

94. E-mail from Noelle Lagueux-Alvarez, Staff Attorney & Program Director, Georgia
Business Court, to author Will Smoak (July 24, 2009, 12:59 EST) (on file with authors).
95. Quir6s et al., supra note 93, at 51.
96. E-mail from Anne Nees, Staff Attorney, Georgia Business Court, to author Will
Smoak (July 18, 2008, 16:43 EST) (on file with authors).

97. E-mail from Noelle Lagueux-Alvarez to Will Smoak, supra note 94.
98. Id.
99. Id.; see FULTON COUNTY SUPER. CT. R. 1004. In addition, Rule 1004 was amended
to provide that a transfer fee of $1000 be assessed to all cases transferred from superior

court to the Business Court upon motion by one or more of the parties, payable on a pro
rata basis by the movant. FULTON COUNTY SUPER. CT. R. 1004(5). No fee is assessed,
however, if the matter is transferred at the request of the superior court judge originally
assigned to the case. Id.
100. E-mail from Noelle Lagueux-Alvarez to Will Smoak, supra note 94.

101.

Id.

102.
103.

Id.
Id.
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later."' Moreover, if a motion is to be decided on the briefs without
oral argument, the Business Court strives to rule within forty-five days
of the parties' completion of briefing."° In sum, the addition of
another experienced jurist to the Business Court's ranks, along with the
Business Court's impressive track record of quickly hearing and
resolving cases, represent important steps toward solidifying the
Business Court's reputation as a special forum designed to administer
and resolve appropriate business disputes in a timely and insightful
manner.
V. LEGISLATION
During the 2009 session of the Georgia General Assembly, a number
of revisions were made to the O.C.G.A., including revisions to Title 7
with respect to banking and mortgage loan origination,"° Title 10 with
respect to electronic records and signatures,0 7 and Title 14 with
respect to limited liability companies. 08
In the wake of a number of bank seizures by regulatory authorities in
Georgia during 2008 and 2009, Title 7 was amended to (1) clarify that
the definition of net assets as it relates to Georgia financial institutions
excludes-for purposes of calculating "total assets'--"good will, core
deposit intangibles, or other intangible assets related to the purchase,
acquisition, or merger of a bank charter,""° (2) provide a carve-out to
allow a Subchapter S bank to petition the Georgia Department of
Banking and Finance (GDBF) for approval of dividends in an amount
sufficient to cover the federal and state income tax liability of its
shareholders, even if statutorily mandated levels of paid-in capital and
retained earnings are not satisfied,"0 and (3) provide the GDBF with
broad power and discretion to investigate violations of rules, regulations,

104. E-mail from Anne Nees to Will Smoak, supra note 96.
105. Id.

106. Ga. H.R. Bill 141, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 86 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 7-1-4, -68,
-91, -243, -285, -460, -651, -684.1, -686, -687.1, -689.2, -692, -703, -704, -707.2, -707.3 (2004
& Supp. 2009)); Ga. H.R. Bill 312, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 252 (amending O.C.GA. §§ 71-1000 to -1021 (2004 & Supp. 2009)).
107. Ga. H.R. Bill 126, § 1, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 698, 699-708 (codified at
O.C.G.A. §§ 10-12-1 to -20 (2009)).
108. Ga. H.R. Bill 308, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 108 (amending OC.G. A- §§ 14-11-

101, -203, -212, -303, -311, -408, -504, -505, -506, -602, -610, -901, -905 (2003 & Supp.
2009)).
109. Ga. H.R. Bill 141, § 1, 2009 Ga. Laws at 87 (amending O.C.G.A. § 7-1-4(24) (2004
& Supp. 2009)).

110. Id. § 6, 2009 Ga. Laws at 89 (amending O.C.G.A § 7-1-460(a)(2) (2004 & Supp.
2009)).
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statutes, and orders by granting it the ability to administer oaths,
require the production of books and records, depose witnesses, and issue
subpoenas for witnesses and documents.'
House Bill 312112 overhauled the Georgia Residential Mortgage
Act... to incorporate relevant provisions of the federal Secure and Fair
Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008 (SAFE Act)"' with
respect to the licensure of mortgage loan originators." 5 The SAFE Act
establishes uniform nationwide licensing standards for mortgage loan
originators in order to safeguard consumers and reduce fraud through
increased oversight and accountability." 6
Effective on January 1, 2010, mortgage loan originators must be
registered with the Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System and
Registry," 7 a database established by the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors and the American Association of Residential Mortgage
Regulators." 8 To register, a mortgage loan originator must submit
information concerning identity, financial services-related employment
history, personal financial history, and criminal history."9 Additionally, the applicant must provide fingerprints to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for a background check. 2 ° A licensed mortgage loan
originator must121renew his or her registration annually prior to December
1 of each year.

With respect to Title 10, House Bill 126122 adopted the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act (UETA). 23 in Georgia.'
The UETA
permits parties to select the use of electronic records and electronic
signatures for any transaction, except transactions subject to Georgia's

111. Id. § 8, 2009 Ga. Laws at 89-91 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 7-1-684.1(c)-(h) (2004 &
Supp. 2009)); id. § 15, 2009 Ga. Laws at 93-95 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 7-1-704(b), (e)-(i)
(2004 & Supp. 2009)).

112.
to -1021
113.
114.
115.
116.
§ 5101).
117.
118.
119.
120.

Ga. H.R. Bill 312, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 252 (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 7-1-1000
(2004 & Supp. 2009)).
O.C.G.A. §§ 7-1-1000 to -1021 (2004 & Supp. 2009).
Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2810 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5101-16).
Ga. H.R. Bill 312, 2009 Ga. Laws at 252.
See SAFE Act § 1501, 122 Stat. at 2810-11 (2008) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
O.C.G.A. § 7-1-1001.1 (Supp. 2009).
O.C.G.A. § 7-1-1000(23) (Supp. 2009).
O.C.G.A. § 7-1-1004(j) (2004 & Supp. 2009).
O.C.G.A. § 7-1-1004(1) (Supp. 2009).

121. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-1005(a) (2004 & Supp. 2009).
122. Ga. H.R. Bill 126, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 698 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 10-12-1
to -20 (2009)).
123. O.C.G.A. §§ 10-12-1 to -20 (2009).
124. Ga. H.R. Bill 126, 2009 Ga. Laws 698.
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Commercial Code125 or the creation and execution of wills, codicils, or
testamentary trusts. 126 The primary object of the UETA "is to estab-

lish the legal equivalence of electronic records and signatures with paper
writings and manually-signed signatures. 27 While it is not possible
to cover every aspect of the UETA in a brief summary, some of the
UETA's primary advantages include: (1) assurance that contracts and
transactions are not refused enforcement because electronic media are
used;' 28 (2) permission for governmental agencies to implement an
electronic recordkeeping system and convert its written records to
electronic records; 129 and (3) validation of contracts formed by electron-

ic agents (for example, computer programs implemented
by a business
30
form).
electronic
in
transactions
execute
to
owner
Title 14 of the O.C.G.A. was amended in several important ways
during the 2009 Session with respect to Georgia LLCs. 131 Under
O.C.G.A. § 14-11-504,132 unless otherwise provided in a written
operating agreement or the articles of organization, a judgment creditor
of a Georgia LLC has no right to interfere with management of the LLC,
to force a dissolution of the LLC, or to seek a court order requiring a
foreclosure sale of an LLC membership interest. 133 Under O.C.G.A.
§ 14-11-505,13 a written operating agreement may assert that a person
becomes a member of an LLC when (1) he or she signs the operating
agreement or (2) he or she complies with the conditions for becoming a
member set forth in the operating agreement and requests in writing
that the records of the LLC reflect his or her admission as a member.'35 Moreover, O.C.G.A. § 14-11-506 11 now specifies that except
as provided in a written operating agreement or the articles of organization, if the last remaining member of an LLC dies or is adjudged
incompetent, that member's executor, administrator, or legal representative becomes a member of the LLC unless the LLC is given written

125.

O.C.G.A. tit. 11 (1994 & Supp. 2009).

126. O.C.G.A. § 10-12-3.
127. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Why States Should
Adopt the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, http://www.nccusl.org/TJpdate/uniform
act.why/uniformacts-why-ueta.asp (last visited Sept. 20, 2009).
128. See O.C.GA. § 10-12-7(b).
129. Id. § 10-12-18.
130. See id. § 10-12-14.
131. See Ga. H.R. Bill 308, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 108 (amending scattered sections
of O.C.G.A. ch. 14-11 (2003 & Supp. 2009)).
132. O.C.G.A. § 14-11-504 (2003 & Supp. 2009).
133. Id. § 14-11-504(b).

134.

O.C.G.A. § 14-11-505 (2003 & Supp. 2009).

135. Id. § 14-11-505(d).

136. O.C.G.A. § 14-11-506 (2003 & Supp. 2009).
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notice to the contrary within ninety days of such member's death or
adjudged incompetency.13 7 Finally, the definition of operating agreement in O.C.G.A. § 14-11_101138 was amended to provide (1) that an
LLC is not required to sign its own operating agreement for the
document to be enforceable against it (unless the operating agreement
itself requires otherwise) and (2) that an operating agreement expressly
may grant enforceable
rights to third parties who are not signatories to
139
such document.

137.
138.
139.

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 14-11-101(18) (2003 & Supp. 2009).
Id.

